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Ricky Busted!



 
 
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  #1  
Old July 18th 05, 11:43 PM
Ricky Alan White
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default Ricky Busted!


The bull**** artist made his local paper. Even gives his address.
Bwahahahahaha! BUSTED!

http://heh.pl/&En
Ads
  #2  
Old July 19th 05, 12:59 AM
DeserTBoB
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On 19 Jul 2005 00:43:21 +0200, "Ricky Alan White "
wrote:


The bull**** artist made his local paper. Even gives his address.
Bwahahahahaha! BUSTED!

http://heh.pl/&En snip


A Polish web address that forwards to "collegemix"...like this has any
relevance to anything.

Noodles, it's time to go back to the ward, and the same with all your
psychotic little friends. Tomorrow, we'll build a replica of the USS
Missouri out of popsickle sticks!
  #3  
Old July 19th 05, 12:54 PM
DeserTBob
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

that link is sick- and I did't post it. But enough of that- get ready
for NEWS !



COMMENTARY


The Smell of Fear

By CALEB CARR
July 19, 2005

The ultimate targets of the London bombings were not, of course, human
beings. Rather, they were a set of governmental policies that the
terrorists hoped to change by separating political leaders from the
support of their shaken citizenry. Despite this distinction, however,
the underlying psychological principles involved in investigating such
crimes remain the same as they would were we studying a mass- or
serial-murder case, of which terrorists are in many respects the
politicized version. Is this to say that the four young men suspected
of being the instruments of terror on this occasion can be classified
as clinical sociopaths? We will likely be unable to answer that
question with certainty, now that they are dead. What we can focus on,
however, are the motivations and perversities of the vastly more
dangerous Islamist clerics and terrorist organizers who sought out
youthful pawns and instilled in them a theology of murder.

Many political analysts have long been anxious to exclude terrorists
from psychological profiling. Some fear that such scrutiny undermines
the rationalization that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom
fighter" (as indeed it does), while others worry that focus on the
mental pathologies of terrorists will detract from whatever legitimacy
their causes may hold -- just as the psychosis of Hitler overshadowed
Germany's grievances about excessive war reparations. But Hitler did
not redress injustices against his nation, he prostituted them to his
megalomaniacal visions. In the same way, the preachers of Islamist
terror are less interested in securing prosperity and dignity for their
peoples than they are in finding new communities of human instruments
that they can enlist in their demented campaign to turn History's clock
back. In all such cases of international criminal psychology, we have
no choice but to move beyond police work and questions of political
motive, and reach for the tools of the forensic psychologist -- most
importantly, the art of profiling.

But it is not only or even primarily the killers and their tutors that
must be so examined: Thorough profiling demands that we also study the
victims, who in cases of terrorism are whole societies. The point is
not to see those societies as they actually are, but as the planners of
the outrage saw them. In this particular case, we must try to
understand why a terrorist group associated to at least a degree with
al Qaeda was suddenly inspired to move beyond the general desire of
that organization's leadership to punish Britain; why, that is, such an
affiliate became overwhelmingly convinced that at this particular
moment, British citizens were not only deserving of the usual terrorist
brand of ritualized bloodshed, but would prove, more importantly,
willing to gratify al Qaeda's demands in the wake of the bombings. What
had these Islamist organizers seen, as they stalked through the land
that had so unwisely given them asylum, that convinced not only them,
but their young acolytes, that the time had come for a
more-than-rhetorical assault on Britain's people?

* * *
These questions will not be answered by focusing on the grievances by
which the terrorists later claimed to have been propelled: The
sociopath's motivations are revealed in his behavior, not in his
grandiose self-justifications. Therefore, we must put the issue of the
timing of the bombings into the context of the series of similar crimes
that have been committed by al Qaeda and its subordinates during the
long and deadly spree that they have pursued since the 1990s. Only a
few examples from al Qaeda's catalogue of outrages resemble the London
attack, in specific purpose and method, enough to be of real use in
establishing this pattern. These few a the attacks on Sept. 11,
2001; the bombings of a synagogue, the British consulate, and a Western
bank in Istanbul in November 2003; and the Madrid bombings in March
2004. What common elements can we establish among these societies at
the given moments that they were victimized?

Of paramount interest is the fact that each nation had recently
exhibited a weakening public determination to aggressively meet the
rising challenge of Islamist terrorism. Consider the U.S. of 2001: The
Clinton administration had left behind a record of essentially ignoring
those few terrorism analysts who asserted that full-fledged military
action against al Qaeda's Afghan training bases, backed by the
possibility of military strikes against other terrorist sponsor states,
was the only truly effective method of preventing an eventual attack
within U.S. borders. President Clinton himself, we now know, at times
favored such decisive moves; but opposition from various members of his
cabinet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and finally (as well as most
importantly) a general public that would not or could not confront the
true extent of the Islamist problem generally, and al Qaeda
specifically, forced him to confine his responses to occasional and
counterproductive bombings -- even as the death toll from al Qaeda
attacks on U.S. interests abroad rose dramatically. Correctly sensing
that the new president, George W. Bush, was treating the terrorist
threat with a similar attitude of denial, al Qaeda's Hamburg-based
subsidiaries launched the 9/11 operation.

Turkey, for its part, had taken the dramatic step of withdrawing its
cooperation with the invasion of Iraq in early 2003. This move had
drastically reduced the number of troops that the U.S. could bring to
bear quickly on the operation, and may have colored the entire course
of the war. Turkish leaders explained their decision by citing concerns
about their nation's role in the region, as well as by saying that they
did not trust the Kurds not to try to take advantage of the invasion.
Perhaps so; but reports persisted that the Turkish government was
worried about revenge attacks by Muslim extremists, along exactly the
lines that (in a seeming paradox) did occur in November. Once again, an
attempt to deal with the terrorist problem through avoidance only
produced savage assaults.

In Spain, during March 2004, a similar public wish to avoid any
forceful confrontation with terrorism prevailed, but for entirely
different reasons: Spain had joined the "coalition of the willing" in
Iraq, which, after enjoying dramatic early success, ran into a buzz-saw
of bitter resistance organized by Saddam loyalists, Iraqis angered by
occupation, and foreign Islamist terrorists (many trained and supplied
by al Qaeda's network). The majority of the Spanish public had never
supported participation in the invasion; and the Iraqi insurgency's
viciousness only made them more committed to adopt a neutral stance in
the global war on terror generally. But Spain was also, at that time,
facing an election, and a bizarre component of that contest were
warnings issued by an obscure Islamist group (later connected to al
Qaeda) which stated that the Spanish people's failure to elect a
candidate who would withdraw troops from Iraq would result in attacks
against them. As election day neared, it seemed likely that voters
would comply; yet despite -- or in fact because of -- this cooperative
posture, the terrorists detonated a particularly cruel series of bombs
aboard commuter trains in Madrid just days before the voting. We may
never know how much the victory of the antiwar Socialist candidate was
prompted by the attacks; what we do know is that Spain's posture of
pre-election submission did not save her citizens, and that after the
election, when the new government did obey the Islamists' demand that
they withdraw troops from Iraq, the terrorists ultimately announced
that not even this move could guarantee Spain's future safety.

In all of these examples, then, the "trigger" for terrorist action was
not any newly adopted Western posture of force and defiance. Rather, it
was a deepening of the targeted public's wish to deal with terrorism
through avoidance and accommodation, a mass descent into the
psychological belief, so often disproved by history, that if we only
leave vicious attackers alone, they will leave us alone. It is hardly
surprising that by actively trying -- or merely indicating that they
wished -- to bury their collective heads in the sand, the societies
were led not to peace but to more violent attacks. Al Qaeda and
terrorist groups in general have tended to press their campaigns of
violence against civilians in areas where they have sensed disunity and
a lack of forceful opposition. In the manner of clinical sociopaths,
they seem to "smell fear" -- and to find in it, not any inspiration to
show mercy or accept accommodation, but a compulsion to torment all the
more vigorously those who exude it.

When the situation is viewed through this lens of victim profiling
(never to be confused with "blaming the victim"), we can begin to see
why al Qaeda's leaders and affiliates evidently began to think
themselves capable of breaking an alliance that once withstood the
assaults of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. For a widespread
psychological phenomenon has gained strength in Britain in recent
years, coming to a crescendo in the last few months. In political and
editorial writings, but perhaps even more tellingly in the mass
entertainment media to which the young bombers were reportedly heavily
exposed, many Britons have subscribed to a new narrative of the
post-9/11 world, one in which the U.K. is portrayed, not as a willing
partner in the invasion of Afghanistan, nor as the author of much of
the incorrect and/or deceptive intelligence that so rallied support in
the West for invading Iraq, but rather as the largely innocent tool of
a nefarious U.S., one whose government has been "bullied" by
Washington. In this remarkably distorted yet equally powerful version
of events, Britain emerges as a nation that would, if its leaders would
only obey the true will of its people, display greater concern with
such benevolent programs as ameliorating world hunger and climate
degradation, and far less with combating terrorism. Indeed, they are
only involved in the latter, runs the new "history," because of Tony
Blair's obliging participation in Mr. Bush's oil-propelled policies.

Nations that experience collective psychological crises frequently
attempt such reinventions, just as do individuals. By revising the
facts surrounding irrationally violent incidents so that they
themselves are somehow made responsible for them, victims often seek to
exert some kind of control over if, when, and how their tormentors will
inflict their random cruelty. But what British citizens who have
participated in this revision of the historical record do not realize
-- just as Americans in 2001, Turks in 2003, and Spaniards in 2004 did
not -- is that showing fear and self-disparagement in the face of al
Qaeda's threats only marks the society in question as a suitable
candidate for attack. Sociopaths revel most in assaulting terrified,
submissive victims; and a Britain so concerned with avoiding attack
that its ordinarily wise citizenry would give voice to the kind of
simplistic thinking expressed in the media in recent months evidently
fit that description to an extent irresistible to al Qaeda's minions
within its borders.

In this light, the trigger for the London bombings was far less the
presence of British troops in Iraq, and far more the media circus that
surrounded protestors outside the G-8 summit, as well as the utterances
of musical and other celebrities during the "Live 8" performances in
support of an end to world hunger, many of whom allowed their
declarations to bleed over from understandable economic and political
sentiments into dangerously blatant statements of opposition to the
Iraq war, the global war on terrorism, and the U.S. generally. As a
branch of sociopaths, terrorist leaders possess their own deformed
cravings for fame, which makes them particularly susceptible to the
false realities projected by celebrities. And if al Qaeda or one of its
cohorts indeed mistook the angry but deeply confused language recently
bandied about Britain as final proof that that nation's will to fight
terrorism had become mortally compromised, then we may well have our
answer for why the London attack occurred when it did: The
long-sought-after moment when a seemingly retreating Britain could be
fully separated from the U.S. had finally arrived. It only required
violent exploitation.

What the result of that violence will be is by no means certain. Early
polls suggest that the majority of the British public has been sharply
and tragically reminded of what its true interests and who its true
friends are, whatever the momentary shortcomings of this or that
government or administration in London or Washington. Is this only a
temporary reaction to outrage? Perhaps, but this much is certain: While
we in the West, in our efforts to defeat al Qaeda's terrorist network,
occasionally elect unwise or even duplicitous leaders and courses of
action, there is no lack of wisdom so profound (to paraphrase the often
duplicitous FDR) as that produced by fear. As it feeds historical
distortion and ignorance, so does fear feed terrorism -- indeed, it is
terrorism's very DNA. Citizens afraid of future attacks, along with
ignorant protestors and careless celebrities, do no good -- do, in
fact, the work of terrorists for them -- when they divide the members
of the most important Western alliance by displaying faintheartedness
at a time when the West needs above all to maintain its unity. Just
now, that unity must be defined as seeing the Iraq endeavor through to
some sort of safe conclusion, if only because al Qaeda have themselves
made it clear that their fate hangs on their ability to demonstrate
their potency, as well as gain a new home, in Iraq.

But whatever the ultimate reaction of the British people to these
latest terrorist outrages, we must hope that American intellectuals and
celebrities will not emulate Britain's recent exercises in wavering,
revisionist behavior. Already there has been unfortunate evidence that
the tendency to "blame the victim" after July 7 was greater in America
than it was in Britain. Such words and actions only cause the scent
that emerges from our own communities to become that of fear -- and
should al Qaeda again detect such an odor inside our borders, we may
expect attacks such as those that struck our oldest and most trusted
ally to once more visit our own shores. And we may expect them very
soon.

Mr. Carr is author of "The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare
Against Civilians," and "The Alienist." He teaches military history at
Bard.

  #4  
Old July 19th 05, 05:02 PM
DeserTBoB
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On 19 Jul 2005 04:54:27 -0700, "DeserTBob"
wrote:

that link is sick- and I did't post it. But enough of that- get ready
for NEWS !



COMMENTARY


The Smell of Fear

By CALEB CARR snip


Who's this, yet another right wing delusional ****tard?

Fact: Wall St. Journal (a reliable source for conservative opinion)
just finished a poll. Even among its own reader base, who
overwhelmingly supported Bush, they favor the Democrats to take over
BOTH houses of Congress in '06, 43% to 31%. Those numbers mean
SERIOUS trouble for the Repuke Party. As if to confirm this,
Pennsylvania's own right wing crank, "Prick" Santorum, is now trailing
ANY Democratic challenger by 20%...a sure-fire loser. Also, note how
only 41% of the US population now believes Bush to be "honest and
trustworthy," per the latest NBC/Gallup poll.

To makes things worse for Bush, they decided to have the White House
stonewall on the Rove scandal and put the miscast RNC chairman, Ken
"Bud" Mehlman, out in front. Every time Mehlman opens his trap, the
Repukes lose another 1% of their swing voters, he's THAT annoying.
They would've been better to put the REAL "Bud Melman" from the old
Letterman show in as their spokesman!

Nice going, right wing ****tards! '06 will be like shooting fish in a
barrel for us!
 




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